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Abstract
To explain war rapes in former Yugoslavia, the work of cultural ideology is never
complete, but an unstable relation between cultural activism and cultural norms and
practices provides the point of departure to move beyond the stereotyped accounts of
mass rapes and develop a neo-structural model of canonical formalization based on
discourse analysis and transformational morphodynamics. Methodologically, the new
model takes lead from the abstract mathematical operations and canonical transforma-
tions suggested by Lévi-Strauss for the structural study of myth. The assumption is that
mass rapes are fueled by a specific cultural activism that activates a cultural ideology
that makes mass rapes effective in a military strategy of ethnic cleansing.
Introduction
Research on sexual violence has been important to identify the historical, strategic,
organizational, political, ideological, and cultural factors that drive rape and other forms
of sexual abuse during wartime. Moving beyond feminist and other commitments in
explaining war rapes during the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere,
this article explores the reified conceptualization of so-called Balkan social structures,
norms, and values, including the Albanian case of social morphology, as a typical
imagination of Southeast European cultures and societies. The aim is not, however, to
review or discuss the homogenized conceptualization of war rapes by women’s groups,
media and scholarship that combined feminism and the Balkanist variant of Oriental-
ism, which might have had some validity for the earliest phases of the uneven
propaganda battles between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and their media and intellectual
extensions at home and abroad. A number of existing studies now criticize and go
beyond the poor frameworks that essentialize local cultural practices and international
public representations of Balkan backwardness for explaining ethnicized mass rapes in
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former Yugoslavia. They already show that wartime sexual violence is not a cultural
given but a strategically used weapon. They also critically address the connection
between ethnicity, kinship and gender through direct engagement with local discourses
and the experiences of mass rape survivors. Yet, the description of cultural norms and
practices, however resourceful, may hark back and end up essentializing them anew.
In this area, it is important to distinguish between behavioral norms and rules of
what most people actually do and say in practice, and which may be explored
ethnographically, and ideal norms and rules for what people ought to do and how they
ought to behave. The latter cannot be observed ethnographically. It is only inferred as a
kind of what is called elsewhere Bcultural activism^, or a kind of a Bcultural Viagra^ for
social survival, which promotes the active support of particular cultural values and
practices to uphold the existing state of social affairs by means of vigorous ideas of
cultural coherence [1].1 In addition, the work of cultural ideology is never complete,
and there is an unstable relation between cultural activism and actual cultural norms
and practices, which depends on particular social and political conditions.
This instability provides the point of departure to move beyond the traditional
accounts of mass rapes in former Yugoslavia and develop a neo-structural model of
canonical formalization based on discourse analysis and transformational
morphodynamics. Methodologically, the new model takes lead from the abstract
mathematical operations and the evolution rules of canonical transformations suggested
by Lévi-Strauss for the structural study of myth, which make it necessary to isolate an
analytical device as a boundary condition for mathematical validation. In the following
section, I provide the historical and epistemological context of structural methodology.
The next section takes issue with a number of intellectual interpretations of wartime
rape strategy across several disciplines. The main argument for a morphodynamic
approach to mass rapes is developed in the third section, followed by another section
where the concept of cultural activism is argued as a boundary condition that may
reasonably account for the political effectiveness of mass rapes as a military strategy of
ethnic cleansing.
Structural methodology
Today anthropology is concerned with questions of feminism, reflexivity, identity
politics, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, human rights, cultural activism, fundamentalism,
and many other related themes. An attempt to restore Lévi-Strauss to a central position
can hardly meet immediately with many of the current social and political issues. Yet it
is possible to show that structural anthropology may innovatively account for much
more than the dynamics of social systems and the praxis of competitive and strategic
behaviors, including the effectiveness of mass rapes as a military strategy and instru-
ment of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss anticipated and called for the advent of
what must be the future of a theoretical anthropology to come [3–7]. Contrary to the
received ideas of his critics, little of recent topical, ethical, methodological or episte-
mological interest escaped Lévi-Strauss’s notice, understanding and engagement. In his
1 Cultural activism corresponds to the traditionalist and survivalist principles of the World Values Survey
cultural map [2].
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writings, we can find the seeds of a new epistemology and a new ethics, involving a set
of new assumptions and procedures for the acquisition of knowledge, a new approach
to methodology and a new global awareness.
However, particularly in the English-speaking world, the true value of Lévi-Strauss’s
works has been obscured by a number of misunderstandings, no doubt been exacer-
bated by problems of cultural rather than linguistic translation, as well as by the
vagaries of intellectual fashion. Just but to equate Lévi-Strauss with structuralism, for
instance, is to distort our understanding of his legacy and his continuing relevance in
anthropology and social theory. Indeed, while revisiting the old debate between Derrida
and Lévi-Strauss on the place of writing [4, 8, 9], we came to the conclusion as many
others (e.g. [10]) that we must legitimately ask to what extent, in the popular imagina-
tion at least, a version of structuralism invented retrospectively by Bpoststructuralists^
has become substituted for the real thing. Not only Lévi-Strauss’s original approach to
history, but above all his actual theoretical and epistemological contribution to general
knowledge and the humanism of structural anthropology as a human science are
seemingly neglected and rarely appreciated, if not deliberately misconstrued, despite
the fact that they are essential aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s theory.
Some of these aspects could lay strong claim to having mapped, within anthropol-
ogy, the philosophical parameters of an increasing preoccupation with issues of
contextualization and reflexivity in the face of the declining coherence of meta-
narrative and grand theory, as well as with issues of political concern and engagement
in the post-colonial era. To the extent of the impact of the new form of humanism
initiated by structural anthropology [11], we may be correct in asserting that Lévi-
Strauss used structural arguments coherently and correctly to analyse the cultural order.
At the same time, he recognized the transient character of this order by means of
entropy and irreversibility, and not surprisingly, deconstruction or rather Bdissolution^,
to use his own term, and self-reflexivity. Arguably, some of these and other aspects of
Lévi-Strauss’s theory may be advanced as a workable methodology helping us to build
innovative anthropological approaches to agency and politics in history, culture and
society.
Actually, a more closely argued and clearly defined theoretical framework could
be designed by means of a careful combination of Lévi-Straussian structural
analysis, cognitive commitments, borderland epistemology and the politics of
practice and agency. Though this must claim further examination at another time,
we may argue that such attempt could provide another instance in which our
theoretical understanding of the world can be made to progress, in the context of
a general revival of the kind of vigorous theoretical debate that tended to disappear
from the field after the postmodern-poststructuralist turns in the 1980s. A thorough
critique of the postmodernist rhetoric of post-structuralism [4, 8, 9], provided
elsewhere in a broader context of the reassessment of structural legacy in anthro-
pology [3, 5, 11], may be considered as a new step toward the innovative movement
and reflexive project of neo-structural constructivism [6, 7, 12]. In particular, the
theoretical project inspired by the canonical formalization in the structural analysis
of myth can show that structural anthropology is intimately concerned with pro-
cesses of social conflict, change, praxis and agency [13]. Arguably, such neglected
but potentially vigorous development in current social and anthropological theory
may not only present new empirical material and substantive findings, but also
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generate a novel conceptual and theoretical synthesis to open up innovative re-
search avenues.
Lévi-Strauss described the generative engine of myths on the basis of the set of their
own transformations by means of a series of terms that are qualified with different
functions. The terms can be characters, things or concepts and categories that are able
to take certain roles. The functions are the different roles carried by these terms. In
mythical networks, the basic transformations that Lévi-Strauss distinguished between a
number of characters or terms of myths and their large number of possible roles or
functions can be of the kind of homology, inversion, opposition, or symmetry. He also
highlighted how these terms and these functions are controlled in mythical thinking by
means of a special relationship that he formulated in a canonical way, which demon-
strates how the transformations of the myths can be captured. Lévi-Strauss’s concept of
canonical formulation that articulates the transformational dynamics of mythical net-
works transcends a simple analogical relation to a quadratic equation,
Fx(a):Fy(b)::Fx(b):Fa-1(y), which articulates a dynamic homology between
meaningful elements and their propositional functions. This formulation made it
possible for Lévi-Strauss to detect a sort of genuine logical machine generative of
open-ended meaning within specified mythical networks.
After the method for the structural study of myth was introduced [14], the
generative virtues of the so-called Bdouble twist^ of canonical transformation
have remained not understood for a long time. Lévi-Strauss almost never
mentioned explicitly his formulation of transformational dynamics, even though
this was implicit in the massive work of his Mythologiques series published
between 1964 and 1971 [15–18]. The morphodynamic principles of canonical
transformations were explicitly operationalized only in his more recent inquiries
published between 1985 and 1991 [19, 20]. One may not know that, but this
does not mean, as an anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this article
submitted to a major anthropological journal claimed, that Lévi-Strauss did not
understand his own theories and that only advanced mathematicians are up to
that task. Instead, we might wonder where that might bring anthropologists,
were we to understand that we have to wait, starting from 1972 [21, 22], for
the knowledge progress in qualitative mathematics become sufficiently ad-
vanced for us to understand Lévi-Strauss’s theories. Especially, after they were
made comprehensible as an anticipated formalization of catastrophe models in
new mathematics and morphodynamics [23–27]. It may be then more conceiv-
able we could use them in approaching the politics of wartime rapes in former
Yugoslavia and elsewhere.
In a broad sense, which is highly relevant to the analysis of wartime rapes,
while the key categories that Lévi-Strauss developed are embodied in the anthro-
pological objects he studied (myths and mythical networks), they have the poten-
tial to be usefully and critically applied to other domains if radically tweaked.
Many studies show that the structural analysis initiated by Lévi-Strauss may
innovatively account for the ways in which social relations are ever more medi-
ated by and implicated in broader political processes [28–30]. In particular, the
requirement of an operating condition that in the study of myth is expressed as a
boundary condition in mathematical sense may be of particular interest for the
study of ideology and agency.
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The heuristic relevance of Lévi-Strauss’s notion of Bcanonical formulation^ is shown
explicitly in the comparative analysis of transformations resulting from intercultural
dynamics and social change [13, 31].2 In this article, the main assumption is that mass
rapes are fueled by a specific cultural activism that activates the cultural ideology of
family honor and blood purity. The neo-structural model is expected to uncover discur-
sive activation of the instrumental politics of cultural activism as a logical necessity that
promotes a new hidden agency, which could explain the effectiveness of mass rapes as a
military strategy of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia and provide a more analytical
framework to rethink comparatively interethnic mass rapes in other contexts.
Traditional accounts of mass rapes have performed an important role by naming the
suffering, recognizing the multiple victims, and condemning the actions of the perpetra-
tors as an international crime. Feminist political and legal commitments in explaining war
rapes during the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia can be read as doing just this, and
doing so with demonstrable sympathy for the victims of sexual violence, despite their
unintended reified conceptualizations. Against the backdrop of suffering, my neo-
structural analysis of instrumental politics could appear as a curious intellectual exercise,
detached from the horror of extreme violence. However, the terms by which the mobili-
zation of cultural activism produce categories of violence and categories of victims may
have implications for how post-conflict and post-violence social repair can take place.
War rapes in former Yugoslavia
It should be no surprise that the rape of women is an old phenomenon, always been part
of warfare and genocide, and flourishes irrespective of nationality or geographic
location. Given the massive occurrence of the phenomenon and the ineffectiveness of
international arrangements, the question arises as to which purpose and which function
rapes do have in wars. Cases of systematic use of rape and sexual violence are
multifarious and the explanations offered are manifold, as the issue received much-
needed attention from scholars across multiple disciplines in recent years. Yet, most
scholars are consumed with the patterns of rape that vary widely in scope, scale,
purpose, and form between and within conflicts [49, 50]. Some of them even employ
much ingenuity to test statistically a host of explanations for the variation by using the
best proxies available [51, 52]. Among dominant patterns of causal attributions and
representations, several layers of causation may be noted. It is not just that sexuality and
violence may be manifest together in troubled times, but that the mass rape and sexual
assault appear standardized in certain ways.
Rape may be analyzed by its effects on male group dynamics, military rankings,
state and ethnic formations, forms of political recruitment, family reorganization,
gender relations, economic and rural/urban differentiation, and forms of political
recruitment and religious purity/pollution. Conflict-related rape and gender-based
2 Structural methodology is implicit in previous works on social morphology [32, 33], processes of identity
construction and cultural socialization [34, 35], women’s agency [36], the myth of many children within the
so-called Albanian patriarchal extended family [1], the religious movements during much of Southeast
European history and politics [37–44], the narrative legacies and international representations of Balkan wars
and their implications in regional and international politics [45–47], or the transformations of European
identity [48].
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violence are a critical issue of human security and a threat to post-conflict reconstitution
and prosperity. Still these effects may clarify why mass rape systematically continues,
but they may not explain why rape occurs in ethnic conflicts, they do not show why
mass rape becomes an effective weapon of the military strategy of ethnic cleansing, and
we know little about what can be done to prevent them. This is because many
explanations fail to take into account the social construction of group interests, security
priorities, and perceptions of right and wrong through social interaction and strategic
framing of particular narratives. Some of these explanations neglect to theorize mass
rapes both as salient markers and as securitization issues of gender, ethnicity, and state
categories at the same time. In particular, they virtually dismiss the structural dimen-
sions of instrumental rape as illustrated during the sinisterly known ethnic conflicts in
former Yugoslavia, which might bring forth rather more productively a concern both
with public culture and with political approach.
When war broke out in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, rape became an
important topic that deserved close scholarly attention, especially with reference to
those aspects of gender and sexuality that are related to ethnicity. While men from all
ethnic groups committed rape, reports of sexual violence during the Bosnian War
(1992–1995) and the Kosovo War (1998–1999) perpetrated by the Serbian military
and paramilitary forces have been described as Bespecially alarming^ ([53]:9). Many of
the patterns of violence directed at civilians appeared to confirm feminist analyses of
the vulnerability of women in ethnic-nationalist conflicts. Gender-targeted violence
once again brought rape in wartime to the attention of the world. Since then, many
consider that rape is more common in certain types of conflict, namely ethnic conflicts,
genocides, and secessionist movements, where it correlates with other forms of
violence.
An important factor contributing to public awareness of the magnitude of rape and
sexual atrocities during the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia has been the increased
activism of journalists, aid workers and feminist scholars in connection with the
international mobilization on behalf of the Bosnian victims of sexual violence.3 A
leading feminist analysis of these rapes was an edited collection [54], which included a
range of feminist voices, along with numerous other journal articles, symposia and
books [55–58]. They came to focus on rape as a weapon of war, an instrument of
genocide, an engine of war, a war tactic, and so on. These expressions reflect a
conception of sexual violence as having a systematic, pervasive, deliberate, or officially
orchestrated function in furthering militaristic, masculinist and/or nationalist goals such
as the destruction of a community [57, 59–63]. All emphasize that rapes Bare not
random acts, but appear to be carried out as deliberate policy^ ([64]:658; [65]). In such
contexts, rape is a political event, located within militaristic or nationalist agendas and
requiring substantive analysis and action.
In most militarized conflicts, rape serves as a strategy to intimidate, degrade,
humiliate, punish, and torture, aimed as a retribution to undermine and emasculate
the enemy. In some cases, rape is a prelude to death. In other cases, rape may be a tactic
3 Major newspapers and media from many countries and a high number of organizations have collected data
and written up reports, commentaries and accounts that have given rise to an enormous though widely
divergent literature on wartime rape, published in print or posted on their websites, both in Western countries
and in former Yugoslavia.
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of secessionist groups intended to signify the end of inter-group relationships [66], or it
may be part of a larger campaign of ethnic cleansing or annihilation, aimed to
deactivate communities and force civilians to abandon territory, in order to assert ethnic
and political dominance. In most cases, rape often involves compulsory performances
of the perpetrator as well as the victim who must enact public rituals of degradation
before significant others.
In the emergence of the global campaign on violence against women, the issue of
rape in the Yugoslavian wars, framed as an attack and a method of ethnic cleansing
against the individual and the collectivity, emerged as a condensation symbol, capable
of evoking deep emotions and provoking suitable responses ([67]:628). Feminist
arguments for the recognition of rape as a weapon of war ultimately gained legal
traction and ultimately became crucial in the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [68], which was prompted to deal openly with these
abuses. The ad-hoc International Tribunal work owes much to the activism and effort of
feminists who had a substantial impact on its determinations that rape is a war crime
and more specifically can constitute a crime against humanity [69, 70], leading to a
greater political visibility of the practice of systematic rape as an instrument of ethnic
cleansing and genocide.4
However, the attempt to protect women’s human rights and to pressure international
institutions to prosecute rape as a war crime has been manipulated primarily by local
governments, politicians and nationalists, but also by local and international journalists
and the media. One of the most disturbing aspects of war rape in former Yugoslavia is
the special explosion of extensive media coverage surrounding the sensationalized
reporting of systematic mass rape, sexual violence and other war atrocities, aimed to
amplify nationalist fervor rather than to help the traumatized women. For multiple
reasons, political and politicking, the excessive role of mass media and modern
technology in the coverage process of ethnic war in former Yugoslavia, including the
vagaries of the last episode in Kosovo, was for long widespread in almost all Western
countries. Indeed, many worried about the fact that some of the media coverage
appeared to have taken on a life of its own, creating a kind of hysteria far from the
experience of the individual victims.
Western media is very often accused of adopting a voyeuristic attitude towards the
rapes [55]. The mobilization of the international community might have subjected
raped women to a new form of humiliation by the media, to use an infamous phrase,
by Bturning rape into pornography^ [60]. Not only rumors about the existence of
videotapes of rapes circulating on the international pornography market but also
American journalist’s jokes or apocryphal stories confirmed the horror of the voyeur-
istic gaze of the West. Activists report that Western journalists barged in refugee camps
offering some women substantial money to tell their story to the international press, or
major news organizations sent faxes to interview women about the rape camps in
former Yugoslavia [71]. One fax received by the Zagreb Centre for Women War
4 In both Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, the International Tribunal was the first institution to convict for
using rape as a weapon of war and to recognize that systematic rape and sexual enslavement in time of war
was a crime against humanity and an instrument of genocide. See UN International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals, ICTR-96-4-T (1998), ICTR-96-4-A (2001), http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/ictr-96-4;
UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (2001), IT-96-
23-A & IT-96-23/1-A (2002), http://www.icty.org/en/case/kunarac/4.
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Victims entered into legend: BRaped Bosnian women, possibly pregnant and speaking
English, were in great demand^ ([72]:79).
More importantly, as shown elsewhere [73], some scholars lend themselves to this
voyeurism with a quite intellectualistic and Eurocentric cast. In their approach, they
prefer the impulsive aspect and the aesthetic representation of rapes throughout the war
in Bosnia, since in war or outside war the most significant fact for them is not Bthe
sociological reality of war as a field of cruelties^ but Bthe cruelty that becomes the
highlight of aesthetic production^ ([74]:190–191). References to the aesthetic in the
context of atrocity are always uncomfortable and raise unavoidable questions about the
ethics and the power dynamics of representation, the potential for sensationalism,
ideological appropriation and obfuscation, and the risks of re-traumatizing and reifying
victims inherent in acts of representing trauma.
Not only the televised report of rapes on the evening news was used in nationalist
media as a highly effective tool in the propaganda war, but there are indications that
some women in Bosnia and Kosovo have also seen the international focus on rape as
depriving women of personality and agency ([66]:35). Women’s groups activists have
very often discussed how documentation of the use of sexual violence in the wars in
former Yugoslavia was employed as propaganda especially in the Western media. The
issue of sexual abuses against women was often manipulated for political advantage in
order to spread war propaganda, to aggravate ethnic-national hatred, to manipulate
Western populations according to the needs of daily politics, and to raise readership and
viewing rates.
It is hugely difficult to make sense of the sexual exploitation and victimization of
women in times of war, not simply because of the difficulties of theorizing rape in
general, which may rely on a professionally conditioned deformity that lends itself to
media mechanism and intellectualism. A growing body of feminist scholarship has
examined post-conflict justice mechanisms such as war crimes tribunals, truth/
reconciliation commissions, peace agreements and international legal instruments as
spaces within which gender norms and identities are defined and reiterated [75–78].
The post-conflict period is often heralded as a richly transformative time in which
social and political relations can be reconstituted, but this literature has also mapped
how gender identity and relations are often reiterated in conservative ways, particularly
through the assessment of gender and sexualized harm [67, 79, 80].
Feminist analyses suggest that when women testify about their own suffering, their
evidence tends to be constrained by the trial or commission process, which limits what
women can speak of, or re-interprets their evidence as tales of sexual violence and
gender inequality [81–84]. The result is a series of Bblind spots^ in transitional justice
both about women’s experience of conflict and about the structural effects of inequality
that hinge on large-scale violence. In particular, feminist legal scholars have critiqued
the ways in which transitional justice institutions persistently elide victim with women
and women with sexual violence as well as the intricate relationship between how
harms are identified and the constitution of particular subject positions in post-conflict
justice mechanisms that construct women as a particular type of victim.
International courts and transitional justice institutions have recognized that gender
and gender inequality produce certain kinds of gendered violence and victims during
periods of extreme conflict [85], which become profoundly destructive and a Bfate
worse than death^ for women of traditional societies. Naming and recognizing
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gendered forms of harm can have an important performative dimension that signals
international condemnation of violence against women, which has been an important
feminist political and legal objective, seen as essential to a transitional reconstitution of
social and political order. However, over the course of the 1990s, the consensus that
emerged among the feminists as a joint representation of their worldview, argument
repertoire, and reform agenda was not, as one might expect, a liberal feminist view that
could split the difference between conservative and leftist feminist ideologies. Instead, a
new feminist organizational style and capacity evolved rapidly into a Bgovernance
feminism^ [86], a term used to capture the complex ways in which the nongovern-
mental activism adopted by feminists aiming to advance specific social interests
infiltrate the State with non-state prescriptions for political engagement with law and
new governance formations. The manifest consensus and the coalitional style adopted
by governance feminists yielded an updated radical feminism, strongly committed to a
dichotomist rule choices in the understanding of male domination and female
subordination.
In a dichotomist feminist approach, which is tagged mistakenly by critics with a
gratuitous and awkward qualification of Bstructuralist feminism^, thinkers and actors
hypothesize that a male/female distinction matters when in some domain of human
affairs male is superior to female so as they could direct their efforts to carrying a brief
on behalf of women [87]. More specifically, the new radical feminists think that women
are a distinct human group suffering distinct harms and requiring distinct advocacy.
Their ambition is to wield the sovereign power of the international legal order to
produce absolute results, which is not to warn and deter but to end impunity, by putting
a supreme emphasis on criminalization, prosecution, and punishment. Over the 1990s,
these feminists discovered ways of implementing their dichotomist view that rape was
not merely a tool of belligerent forces but part of a global war against women. As
international legal reforms took shape, a new feminist idea was clarified, in which
international law relating to armed conflict could be about women, not as a particular
group of humanity but a universe of their own [78]. Such feminist universalism made it
possible to look at the eruption of ethnic-nationalist conflict in former Yugoslavia as a
war against women, which involved a chilling indifference to any acknowledgement
that men suffered and died in it, ultimately reproducing in reverse the blind-spotted
moral vision that it contests.
Feminist international security scholars have also written extensively on the ideolog-
ical importance of a valorized misogynistic masculinity. They emphasize the extent to
which the maintenance of group cohesion and effectiveness involves instrumental
mechanisms of misogynistic training and bonding practices that are rooted in the larger
discursive context of armed organizations as sites of masculinization through violence
and gender-based violence [88, 89]. Gang rape is often used as a socialization mecha-
nism or a Brite of initiation^ to bond forcibly recruited fighters and improve the morale
of perpetrators. Serbian factions in the Yugoslavian wars also employed rape, which
they identified as a Bbrotherhood of guilt^ ([90]:112), to ensure that fighters could not
leave their units for fear of having to reconcile their actions. Security scholars argue that
in armed groups organizational factors take precedence over individual dynamics in
driving violence against civilians [52]. In this argument, organizational pressures oper-
ate through a variety of mechanisms, including individual conformity to group norms
and propensity to obey commands, because of the hierarchical structure and the social
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identity of armed groups, where members are often socialized into hyper-masculinist
and misogynist group norms and preferences that promote collective sexual violence.
Similar attempts to consider mass rape outside of an immediate outrage or ascription
of chaos and pathology threatens to become independent of compelling human con-
cerns. There is perhaps a welcome relief in referring men’s sexual violence to some-
thing other than their choices, especially when we relegate it to the workings of a
masculine ideology, a psycho-physiological contingency, a by-product of sex-driven
psychobiologism [91, 92], or an evolutionary adaptation and a natural history of rape
[93, 94]. These approaches may claim some expedient attraction in clarifying why
ordinary men can turn into rapists, but they are highly dubious and largely discredited,
even though they may happen to be confirmed by asking both the perpetrators and the
victims [95]. Whether there is an irrepressible urge or not, and what consequences it
has, seems more likely to depend on the social conditions and on the construction of
sexuality prevailing in a particular time and place, which may have in turn a consid-
erable impact on the psyche and the emotional balance of the individual.
Not surprisingly, feminist scholars prepared the ground for an ahistorical approach
[96]. From the start, they characterized rape as Ba conscious process of intimidation by
which all men keep all women in a state of fear^ [97], arguing that the Bterror warfare^
of collective sexual violence [98] is only the frankest expression of men’s power over
women, as an emblem of the politics of gender aimed at the depersonalization of
women. This standard dichotomist view, which is identified with much American
feminist scholarship, is seen as a sufficient reason for the existence of the phenomenon
and the development of rape ideologies that valorize misogynistic masculinity.
Prominent western feminists have extended their theorization of rape to wartime and
genocidal rape, but they virtually continue to locate rape in male/female relations [99].
They may even come to the conclusion that rape is not a sexual but an aggressive act or
describe rape as a Bpseudo-sexual^ or Banti-sexual^ act that has nothing to do with
sexuality but with the exertion of sexual violence directed against women. In line with
older sex-drive theory approaches, rapes are considered a result of male sexual
frustration in pre-industrial societies with strongly regulated sexuality. In this context,
male sexuality is again established as an ahistorical constant, understood to follow the
Bhydraulic reductionist^ theory of a steam boiler or pressure cooker [65]. According to
this transgressive argument, also advocated by some psychobiological anthropologists,
the expression and realization of uncontrollable male sexual propensities are usually
checked by social sanctions but unleashed or promoted through the opportunities of
war. Military rape would be Bthe unchaining of a generally disallowed biological
imperative of absolute desire and destruction following an increase in individual power
over others^ ([100]:11). For radical feminists, men engaged in warfare, even if fighting
on opposing sides, share an understanding of rape, prostitution, pornography and
sexual killing as an excess of passion in peace or the spoils of victory in war.
In the last analysis, they refuse to consider that rape has a political concern not only
when it is a crime of men against women, but also when it is linked to genocide as a
crime against the group to which a woman is assumed to belong. Ironically, some
feminists tend to subvert the political use of rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing
and genocide, simply because they assume this kind of argument would make women
as individuals cease to exist and would Bdestroy the transnational solidarity of women
who are less inclined than men to identify with the Nation^ of their ethnic group
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([72]:80). Similarly, other human rights scholars also find problematic the language of
ethnic cleansing and genocide in former Yugoslavia and try to play down the instru-
mental politics of mass rapes, simply because they believe this assumption would
dictate in the first place a devastating effect on the human rights of children born of rape
[101, 102].
These unnecessarily patronizing claims cannot explain mass rape in specific wartime
contexts, such as the Bosnian war and the Kosovo war in former Yugoslavia or
anywhere else. They tend to forget arguments that are more inclusive, such as those
considering that gender relations and human rights crosscut other social and political
relations and that gender identities are constitutive elements of other identities. In
particular, they ignore anthropological feminist analyses of how rape was a weapon
of genocide against women both as individuals and as members of specific ethnic
groups [103, 104]. More generally, these interpretations overlook a wealth of both
current anthropological scholarship and feminist normative criticism that historicize
shifting gender dynamics and their relationship to political violence. If women on all
sides suffered as rape victims, this does not need overlooking that rape was deployed
and experienced differently as a weapon of war and instrument of genocide depending
on local histories, ethnicities, interpersonal dynamics, and cultural norms.
The ideological importance of radical feminist and other ahistorical approaches is to
assume an essential and everlasting misogynistic character of conflict-related rape,
which inadvertently reifies the organizational factors and the politics of gender in
armed groups. Such approaches rest on an essentialist view of masculinity as funda-
mentally aggressive and of femininity as fundamentally sensitive. They presume all
men are inherently absolute aggressors limited only by social norms and all women are
perfect victims to be protected by legal instruments. Yet, the Tribunal record is also
claimed to constrain the types of victims and forms of harm that constitute the victim as
naturally gendered [105]. Ultimately, the focus on sexual violence ends up defining
women exclusively by the violations to their bodies, thus perpetuating their domina-
tion. The complexity of violence is also stripped away by a Bnarrower gendered focus
on gross violations of human rights^ when archetypal representations of the sexually
abused Bwoman victim^ stand in as a conceptual shorthand for the complexity of large-
scale violence and atrocity ([106]:74).
A reframing in gender terms flattens the complexity of women and men’s experi-
ences of violence and renders some victim subjects visible at the expense of others. In
these frames, men are agents, while women are victims of sexual violence and innocent
in matters of war and violence. Men may experience human rights abuse but women
experience sexual abuse, which further impacts on the ways in which essential cate-
gories of women are positioned as always raped or inherently rapable and rape is
depicted as almost a natural or inevitable gendered consequence of genocidal conflicts
between polarized sides seen as essentially ethnic or nationalist. In the context of ethnic
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the representational power of the iconic woman victim
integrated Bspecific lived experiences, of specific women and men within specific
political and cultural contexts, with supposedly universal meanings^ ([107]:13). In
particular, a number of scholars made assertions about the presumed conservative,
patriarchal and incidentally Islamic nature of Bosnian community, concluding that
Bosnian women raped during the wars would experience heightened social stigma.
This characterization, which mistakenly elided Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia with
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Muslim societies in the Middle East, was uncritically taken up and reproduced in public
opinions in the 1990s.
Remarkably, even in the Krstic trial process at the International Tribunal, Bosnian
women’s lives in a traditional patriarchal society and their identity as Muslim rather
than Bosnian become the dominant lens through which their experiences as victims of
genocide were understood.5 The variable meanings and complexities of patriarchy as
lived and understood both in Bosnian society [108] and in witness testimonies [106] are
stripped away, and patriarchy is asserted as an universal Bosnian experience without
nuance or context. In this way, the International Tribunal emerges as another integral
part of a system of knowledge production that filters evidence and establishes official
versions, not just about the past or about the social, political, and economic relations
that structure violence and its effects ([106]:75), but also about the reified conceptual-
ization of traditionalist gender inequalities, ethnic divisions, and culturalist oddities like
patriarchalism.
In addition, the kind of pop-cultural feminism as reflected in public media narratives
and representations had another Balkan variant, bringing a distorted image of Southeast
European peoples as barbaric Btribal haters^ outside the realm of reason and civiliza-
tion. The implication was that violence and genocide are part of the local culture and
therefore inevitable in the Balkans. Many commentators followed suit in an attempt to
explain mass rape in terms of a supposed Balkan culture that encouraged a cult of
manly heroism and violence [54, 55], a central theme of which became the exploration
of the exotic forms of masculinist violence used in former Yugoslavia. Hence, the
derisive comment prejudiced by feminist commitments that BBalkan men have proved
eager to fight and die for their particular subdivision of Slavic ethnicity, which they
further define by religious differences… But Balkan women, whatever their ethnic and
religious background, and in whatever fighting zone they happen to find themselves,
have been thrust against their will into another identity: They are victims of rape in
war^ ([109]:180).
Coupled with nationalist perspectives, the construction of a somehow uniquely
Balkan image of Southeast European peoples also implied the reification of homoge-
nous national groups into entities with radically different identities [110]. In particular,
Serbian identity was set apart from the civilized world, seen as advocating vengeance
and derived from Bthe blood-cloudy mists of extremist nationalist legends^ of which
the most important element is Bthe Chetnik cult of the knife^ ([55]:80). The represen-
tation of rape as something to be expected during wartime will rely on the construction
of a so-called Balkan tradition coming close to a construction of eternal ethnic hatred
and brutality, since the Balkans have always had a repetitive history of violence.
Historical continuity firmly in place, the discovery of mass rape in Bosnia or in Kosovo
will not seriously shake the foundation of this discourse.
Another way of approaching the dimensions of mass rape and sexual violence
during the sinisterly notorious ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia has been to explain
them specifically against the cultural background, among other things by using local
concepts such as blood ideology and family honor. They are supposedly supported by
the existence of a tribal society, complex joint family structures known as zadruga in
5 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-98-33-T (2001), IT-98-33-A (2004),
http://www.icty.org/case/krstic/4.
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South Slavic areas, customary laws known as Kanun in North Albanian area, patriar-
chal practices, and other savage customs. As a result, many Western commentators are
easily willing to believe that Southeast European peoples still live strictly by archaic
tribal laws, which is not only obscure but also unscrupulous.
The problem is that honor is reified as a moral system instead of being considered as
a political resource. In fact, whichever reference to blood mentality in relation to post-
communist turbulence in Albania, or to sexual violence in former Yugoslavia, becomes
fundamentally a pure rhetoric. Nevertheless, as argued elsewhere, similar interpreta-
tions contributed to construct the Balkan image of Southeastern Europe in international
representations with decisive implications in the global politics of regional affairs,
including the advocating of the policy of non-intervention in Bosnia and the further
containment of Western Balkans [45–47]. As a result, the insistence on international
security contributed to install a fundamental political and ethical distance between the
West and the so-called Balkan wars.
Reading the exposure of mass rape through the prisms of essential Balkan brutality
and essential women’s victimization made also possible to claim that while more
Bosnians had been raped than Serbians, it was still the case that rapes have been
carried out by all sides [54]. The problem is not that Bosnian and Albanian women
were the only victims of rape, and the violence perpetrated against other women must
not be minimized. However, there is ample evidence that in former Yugoslavia this type
of crime was overwhelmingly committed by the Serbian forces and this was identified
as a crime against humanity in the indictment of Serbs at the International Criminal
Tribunal.
What is more, Serbian strategic use of rape representations for political purposes
began in Kosovo before the first shot was heard in former Yugoslavia, when Serbian
victimization and militancy found place in the symbolism of women’s body. At that
time, local Serbian activists in Kosovo and Belgrade-based nationalist intellectuals and
clerics began to campaign against a growing Albanian majority in Kosovo, character-
izing Albanian high birth rates as a conspiracy of sexual aggression and alleging a
genocidal plan to exterminate Serbs by using rape to inspire terror. Many of the claims
that Albanians might have started the very war of rape were not backed by factual
evidence but were built up as popular rumors believed amongst Serbs in Kosovo [111].
Nevertheless, they were actually used later to detract international attention from the
Serbian genocidal politics of mass rapes in both Bosnian war and Kosovo war.
Despite the many visibilities of wartime sexual violence, some Bcritical^ feminist
scholars do not take account of the apparent paradox of wartime sexual violence that
has heightened visibility in some contexts and relative invisibility in others. They may
even overlook the feminist concerns that violence against women in wartime remains
largely invisible as a matter of political urgency and they discard explanations by the
selective mobilization of rape narratives for nationalist propaganda. When feminist
legal scholars argue for an alternative approach through a focus on Bwhat actually
happens during rape situations^, considering variances and exceptions at a Blevel of
detail with all the inconsistencies and complexities revealed^, this cannot make it
possible to imagine Ba situation where rape is not inevitable^ ([105]:161). In this
situation, the sociological problem to be explained becomes the detailed experiences
of violence, rather than violence and its instrumental links to gender and power, while
wartime rape and sexual violence become relativized and ultimately wiped out.
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In particular, the feminist insistence that women of all ethnic groups were victims of
rape perpetuated the perception and finally a position of Beveryone is guilty ,^ which
turned out to be a moral obfuscation and the final fallback position of Serbian
nationalism [112]. Actually, the moral relativism of generalized guilt allowed again a
convenient avoidance of the stubborn fact that innocents suffered and their suffering
was inflicted upon them deliberately. The legalist insistence to consider the social
complexity that shaped individual experiences of the genocide, which is claimed to
be glossed over in an approach to rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing and
genocide [105], becomes another instance of the same moral relativism. Similarly,
the feminist insistence to subvert the political use of rape as an instrument of ethnic
cleansing and genocide simply because this kind of argument is assumed to destroy the
transnational solidarity of women [72], is nothing but an immoral relief of the genocidal
politics of Serbian nationalism. Again, the humanrightist insistence to distinguish the
short-term politics of forced impregnation from the long-term politics of community
destruction, which is claimed to impinge on the human rights of children born of war
rape [101, 102], may become inadvertently another attempt at the same moral
relativism.
From the ethnographic record of ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, it can be
observed that claims of opposed factions are often similarly phrased, revealing both the
rules of the game and the degree to which actors are prepared to commit and tolerate
deviations from the prevailing set of rules. Mutual recriminations about sexual atroc-
ities and other violence against human rights, as Michael Herzfeld noted in other
contexts ([113]:125), are evidence at least as much of shared symbolism as they are
of real differences in the respective fates of embattled populations. This becomes
especially clear in the meticulously intimate investigations of ethnographic engagement
with the pragmatics of social interaction that turns abstract moral judgments into the
objects of critical inquiry. Similarly, the historical anthropological approach reveals the
long-term effects of kinship connections and matrimonial strategies, inheritance prac-
tices, moral norms, and instrumental ideologies. A combination of ethnography and
historical anthropology to structural analysis may allow a new theoretical and method-
ological approach to explain the effectiveness of mass rapes as a military strategy of
ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia to which we now turn.
A morphodynamic approach to mass rapes
Fieldwork apprehension and the acquired knowledge in anthropological theory may
show how projected mythologies are determined by the gender construction of the
world, while at the same time they are supported by a local cultural background.
Nevertheless, it is important to work outwards from rape rather than inwards toward
rape from a particular social system. We should examine rapes by their specific
constellation of practices and discourses. A more specific and contextualized analysis
must incorporate and situate theories of rape according to structural variations in ethnic
relations intersected rather than overcome by gender relations. One of the most
important achievements of both structural analysis and feminist approaches has been
to reveal that gender is a structural feature of all-encompassing representations of the
world. To think comparatively about rape in ethnic war, we must understand gender
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relationship to ethnicity in more complicated ways. Essentially, the reality of the world
must be located in the meaning-production morphology of relations, structures, and
values underlying the gender arrangement and gender construction within a socio-
cultural context.
Feminist scholars have forcefully emphasized that rape, as a forced sexual inter-
course, is not a simple aggressive expression of sexuality, but rather a sexual expression
of social violence. Similarly, it can be argued that marriage is not only a social
institution of sexual relations, but also a sexual regulation of social violence and a
sexual institution of social stability. Leaving aside many other ways in which political
philosophers, legal scholars and religious specialists have viewed marriage, from a
structural anthropological perspective, matrimonial strategies are intended to seal
political alliances and conceal debts of blood, honor or money. Though normally a
customary transaction of women exchanged between agnatic groups of men [114], by
marriage several different kinds of rights are allocated. Marriage is a transaction and
resulting contract in which individual partners are recognized by society as having a
continuing claim to the right of sexual access to one another, while children are
recognized as legitimate by establishing their legal parents ([115]:183).
There is quite a large literature on Southeast European social structures (see [116])
and almost all note that kinship terminological systems, marriage patterns and ideo-
logical cultural elaborations differed even between Slavic peoples. Unless we revert to
old anthropogeographical stereotypes [117], it would be hard and outdated to bring
these accounts into whatever might be a kinship morphology and family honor
ideology of the Bosnian war and the Kosovo war in former Yugoslavia. Mass rapes
during these conflicts may not differ essentially from mass rapes in other conflicts. On
one hand, the dominant traditionalist-survivalist values of family honor ideology are
not specific to Southeast European societies, and may exist in many parts of the world,
despite steady changes in the World Values Survey cultural map [2], albeit in different
ways linguistically. On the other hand, kinship and gender norms in one context cannot
be generalized to explain ethnicized mass rapes in other areas, and there might be
nothing specific in any context that does not obtain in areas with different kinship and
gender norms. Therefore, the exploration of the specific cultural and ideological context
of Albanian kinship morphology is aimed only as a comparative illustration of a more
general process of the silencing of human agency, in particular women’s agency, under
the appearance of structural coherence.
The Albanian opposition between the tree of blood and the tree of milk did not
indicate male descent and female descent, but always the male descent either in paternal
or in maternal line. Similarly, the composite term of gjak e gjini, literally Bblood and
gender^, indicates a real recognition of the membership to the corresponding paternal
or maternal line series [33]. In turn, the distinction between blood tree and milk tree
makes it possible to articulate kinship to other political and ideological systems [32].
Two patrilineal groups that share the same milk tree are in the position of in-laws or
allied affinal partners (Fig. 1).
The meaning that Albanians give to a relation of matrimonial alliance and affinity
systematically included a structural relation that was often a parallel close relationship
of friendship and hospitality, which is contracted between two patrilineal groups, or
blood trees, aiming to share the same milk tree. Generally contracted on the model of
the relations of matrimonial alliance or filial adoption, these notions often bring
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symbolically together the intrinsic values embodied in two different blood trees.
However, hostility and feud are also established the same way between two different
blood trees against a distance of conflict, often forcefully emphasized by the difficulty
or the refusal to share a milk tree. The term that expresses the feud in Albanian is once
again gjaku, the Bblood^, while the very notion of vengeance is expressed by a
descriptive term, gjakmarrje, literally Bblood taking^, and the term gjakësi properly
signifies the blood feud as a Brelation of conflict which provokes bloodshed in the
group^.
Definitely, both marriage and vengeance rest on the symbol of blood and both are
institutions that give shape to alliances. If marriage created a network of alliances and
divided society in exogamous groups, vengeance also created a continuously moving
scenario in which memberships and strategic alliances constantly coagulated the
consistency of agnatic groups. Similarly, while marriage produces the alliance of one
blood to another blood, the blood that claimed alliance is what was poured for the
honor of the family and which demanded the obligation of vengeance. Clearly,
matrimonial affinity and hospitality, on the one hand, and feud vengeance and hostility,
on the other, were interchangeable categories insofar as they were always relations of
mutual obligation and constraint (Fig. 2).
A relation of matrimonial affinity and hospitality was experienced as a relationship
of friendship and solidarity just as a relation of feud vengeance was lived as a
relationship of hostility. Yet, if matrimonial affinity and feud vengeance were opposed
to one another as much as many other structural modalities of association or dissoci-
ation between different agnatic groups, friendship and hostility were part of the same
opposition. Matrimonial affinity and feud vengeance, friendship and hostility were only
Fig. 1 The orthogonal encounter between a milk tree and a blood tree does not yield a marriage alliance but
the convergence of Ego’s paternal and maternal ascending lines: Matrimonial alliance is a parallel close
relationship contracted between two blood trees aiming to share the same milk tree
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different expressions of a single and unique structural relationship. Definitely, the
whole of social relations and values remained placed under the sign of ambivalence.
In this sense, at a more empirical level, emotional sentiments as well as social relations
and values of affinity, friendship, and hospitality, must have something in common with
the relationship of love and solidarity to hatred and disintegration. Precisely this kind of
structural ambivalence may allow a new structural model to explain the effectiveness of
mass rapes as a military strategy of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia.
Typically, rape in the ethnic conflicts of former Yugoslavia was a transaction of
women exchanged between competing groups of men, but also an enforced transaction
that was intended to break any political alliances and signify a definite ethnic cleansing
of territory and community. In this case, the political significance of rape is aimed to
substitute the tree of blood legitimated by marriage for another tree of blood that,
although illegitimate, is construed following the same structural pattern. From the
position of structural logic, marriage becomes possible by the means of matrimonial
alliance that is supposed to bring love, friendship, and solidarity. In the same way, rape
can be defined as a confrontational misalliance that becomes possible by the means of
war, and which would necessarily induce hatred, hostility, and disintegration.
During the Bosnian War, mass rape campaigns were undertaken with the express
purpose of impregnating women and forcing them to bear children. The existence of
deliberately created rape camps was reported, where Serbian forces perpetrated public
rapes in front of numerous witnesses, villagers and neighbors [118–120]. The reported
aim of these rapes was to impregnate the Bosnian and Croatian women held captive in
an attempt towards ethnic cleansing. Some military camps served exclusively as rape
camps, such as the one at Foça, where the Serbian policies of mass rape, forced
impregnation and forced maternity were implemented. Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na, the camps were set up in nearly identical ways-they even had the same layout and
patterns of rape [121]. Women were detained and forced to endure repeated gang rapes
Fig. 2 Marriage and feud ambivalences
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intended to impregnate them and were repeatedly told that they were being raped in
order to Bplant the seed of Serbs in Bosnia^ and give birth of a new generation of
Serbian children [102]. Narratives told by hundreds of women held at camps around
Bosnia suggest that women were raped repeatedly and once impregnated they were
held in detention until abortion was no longer an option ([122]:110–111). Forced to
carry Serbian children through repeated rape, these women were only released slightly
before the birth of a child conceived of rape ([55]:77).
During the Kosovo War, thousands of Kosovo Albanian women became victims of
the same patterns of sexual violence as during the Bosnian War. Virtually all of the
sexual assaults documented in Kosovo were gang rapes, with the majority of the
perpetrators being Serbian paramilitaries, but also including Serbian special police
and Yugoslav army soldiers.6 In addition, some women were forced to retrieve their
bridal attire from their dowry chests and wear it while dancing in a circle in a courtyard,
before they were raped.7 Assuming that the male kin, who were fighting in the hills,
could see what was happening but were unable to come to the women’s rescue, the rape
of women in their bridal dresses in Kosovo was aimed to emphasize the dynamics that
controlled Albanian women’s sexuality as the site of men’s own sexuality and power. In
all cases, the accounts from both surviving victims and convicted soldiers provide
additional evidence that implementing the policy of forced impregnation and maternity
were the strategy dictated by Serbian authorities and generally perpetrated to ensure
that the women of the adversarial ethnic group will give birth to children of their
enemies.
Through the implementation of policies of forced impregnation and forced
maternity, rape served not merely to torture or degrade, but also to Boccupy the womb^
of the women of the enemy [122]. Remarkably, when a woman was raped in this war,
the ethnic-national membership of the rapist and the possible foetus became the focal
matter of concern for the ethnic-national community of the raped woman, dismissing
both her and the crime committed against her. Reports focused almost exclusively on
the crimes of the Bother^ side, creating a context for Bour^ women’s womb and body to
be considered as an Boccupied^ territory, which posits a Bsexual geography of
ethnicity^ that connects rape to exclusive territoriality [107]. In such a context, public
debates focused on whether they should be allowed to have an abortion so that they do
not carry Bthe enemy’s seed in their wombs^. Women’s right to abortion took the shape
of an almost military intervention and the question of the right to abortion became an
important component in the military strategy of Bterritorial^ cleansing [124].
Commonly, the notion of cleansing is also related to abortion both in Serbian/
Croatian/Bosnian language (kiretaža) and in Albanian language (spastrim). With regard
to Bterritorial cleansing^ and Bethnic cleansing^ as a newly-conceptualized military
strategy of genocide in war in the former Yugoslavia, women in the region will easily
understand the painful meaning of the term since cleansing is above all a part of
women’s experience.
6 Human Rights Watch, Serb Gang Rapes in Kosovo Exposed, 20 March 2000 (https://www.hrw.
org/news/2000/03/20/serb-gang-rapes-kosovo-exposed), Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: rape as a weapon
of ethnic cleansing (https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/fry/index.htm).
7 Information reported by Nita Luçi
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This is not, however, to understand women’s experiences of rape and marriage
in a binary and rigid structuralist relation. There is necessarily a problem with
this argument that is inspired from Aristotle’s logic of analogy (Rhetoric
1402b15, Pr.An.69a1), which set the stage for all modern theories and sophisti-
cated analyses of analogical reasoning. In this case, Aristotle’s logic of analogy
cannot be valid and analogical reasoning of any type of thinking that relies upon
an analogy or comparison between marriage and rape that highlights respects in
which they might be thought to be similar will be misleading (Fig. 3). Following
Aristotle’s logic, the analogical argument as an explicit representation of a form
of analogical reasoning may take some accepted similarities between marriage
and rape to support the conclusion that some further similarity may exist.
However, this argumentative form is not a complete inductive reasoning as it
Bdoes not draw its proof from all the particular cases^ (Pr.An.69a15), but
requires an additional and deductively valid syllogism as the final step, which
is arguably provided by the application of Lévi-Strauss’s canonical formulation.
On empirical grounds, if the metaphysical ambivalence of marriage may bring at the
same time love and solidarity as well as hatred and hostility, in the case of rape, even
though structurally construed like marriage, there is no ambivalence, because there is
no way that rape can bring other than hatred, hostility, and disintegration. Actually, rape
is unspeakable, unthinkable, and beyond human understanding. We can only offer a
breaking down in abstract mathematical terms as an inferential process deductively
valid to account for the effectiveness of mass rape as a military strategy and political
instrument of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia. To this aim, a reformulation is
proposed of the catastrophist model suggested by Lévi-Strauss for the structural study
of myth.
After some preliminary work on mass rapes during the ethnic wars in former
Yugoslavia [12, 73, 125, 126], it may also be argued that the heuristic relevance of
Lévi-Strauss’s notion of canonical formulation could reasonably stand for under-
standing their effective politics as an instrument of ethnic cleansing. Based on
Lévi-Strauss’s morphodynamic theory, categories like terms and functions are
Fig. 3 The impossibility of analogical reasoning in the case of Marriage and Rape
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considered as ontology-specific renderings of more general categories. They map
onto categories like langue and parole (Saussure), kind and index (Peirce), com-
petence and performance (Chomsky), status and role (Linton), power and its
exercise (Hobbes), and even essence and appearance in certain philosophical
traditions. In the context of ethnic conflict, such specific categories need to be
articulated in relation to a broader set of categories and resolutely theorized in
terms of their mutual transformations. Namely, transformational variables of
indexical terms of either marriage or rape, which are qualified with different
instrumental roles or function values of group politics, can be singled out in
specific collective instances of social behavior as they are enacted and practiced
in articulation with conflict ontologies and cultural ideologies.
Rape carried out by the Serbian forces was not isolated acts or a secondary
effect of the conflict but deliberate and organized crimes against populations, an
instrument of terrorization as part of a systematic policy and genocidal campaign
of ethnic cleansing [53–55, 121, 127, 128]. The bodies of Bwrong^ women, the
female representatives of adversary ethnic groups, served as the main target of
these dehumanizing acts. In this way, women’s bodies constituted the battlefield
where men communicated their rage to other men. The primary purpose of rapes
as a weapon of war was to cause profound humiliation, degradation, and
intimidation to ensure the survivors would leave and never return [129]. It served
to destroy cultural and social ties of the victims and their communities by
inflicting humiliation and shame [56] and it was Bperpetrated with the conscious
intention of demoralizing and terrorizing communities, driving them from their
home regions, and demonstrating the power of the invading forces^ ([130]:34).
Arguably, to establish a comparable point of reference for the Serbian genocidal
politics of mass rapes in former Yugoslavia, Bnot even the Nazis managed to
invent a way to turn the biological process of gestation into a weapon of
annihilation^ ([55]:91).
Serbian gang rapes in Bosnian detention camps always involved a perfor-
mance for a public audience, while some rapes were not only publicly per-
formed but also filmed with video technology. Whether these films were sold
as pornography for mass consumption like news and entertainment, which was
also used to whip up a popular frenzy for the Serbian war effort, is a notorious
matter of dispute between activists and scholars. As a rule, they are closely tied
to the propaganda efforts of either Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian government, or
to different strands of feminist activism aiming to promote their own agendas
[131, 132]. It is quite possible that polemicists and demagogues have circulated
with great delight some grotesquely exaggerated and made-up horror tales as
empirical facts. The alarming claim remains, however, that Bthe world has never
seen sex used this consciously, this cynically, this elaborately, this openly, this
systematically with this degree of technology and psychological sophistication,
as a means of destroying a whole people^ ([60]:27). This remains true in spite
of many efforts that actually paralleled Serbian propaganda of Beveryone is
guilty ,^ which has been quite common for a long time in approaching the
ethnic conflicts of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia.
Apparently, in this context, an innate or learned psychological bias may lead
members of ethnic groups to discount or ignore their own involvement in
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producing ethnic conflict, so that the other should take all the blame. Following
Tajfel’s Bsocial identity theory^ [133], if people have an innate desire for self-
esteem, then they may be irrationally reluctant to believe that members of their
own group, especially their leadership, could be responsible for reprehensible
acts. The astonishing denials encountered from Serbian intellectuals at home
and abroad confronted with evidence of genocide and crime against humanity
both in Bosnia and in Kosovo is a good example of this mechanism at work
([134]:854).8 In this puzzle, it is hardly surprising that many commentators
remain shocked at mass acquiescence to the machinations of their own national
elites to minimize war atrocities, while claiming that they engaged successfully
in “psychological warfare” (e.g. [97]:228).
In turn, among interviewed women a general concern was that the issue of rape
should not be stressed at the expense of the Serbian campaign of slaughter and
genocide against the civilian population of Bosnia and Kosovo, male and female alike.
Very often Bthey didn’t want in any way to let the rape overshadow the real problem,
which is the extermination and execution of thousands and thousands of men and
women^ ([135]:119). A participant in a New York conference on Bosnia said that as a
Bosnian woman she felt that Bthe international emphasis on rape was inappropriate,
because all Bosnian women were victims: they lost their homes, their sons, their
husbands, their jobs, their lives, and whether they had been sexually assaulted or not
was not really the most important problem^ ([66]:35). Some feminist had reproached
Albanian women in Kosovo for having denounced only ethnically motivated violence
([136]:173), but a Kosovo activist said they could not have done otherwise as Bthey
were experiencing a double violence against their men and themselves^ ([67]:641).
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia did not treat explic-
itly the mass rapes as genocide. However, in the case related to the Bosnian War
decided by the International Court of Justice, the verdict held that the Srebrenica
massacre was a genocide and that Serbia had committed a breach of the Genocide
Convention. The World Court concluded that the acts at Srebrenica Bwere committed
with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as such, and accordingly that these were acts of genocide^ committed by
Serbian military forces.9 The World Court heard the requests to include the practice of
terrorizing the non-Serbian population, the infliction of pain and the administration of
torture as well as the practice of systematic humiliation into this category of acts of
genocide. It also put Ba particular emphasis on the issue of systematic rapes of Muslim
8 Even an anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this article submitted to a major anthropological
journal went to considerable length to discard genocidal rape as a “pure rhetoric, not a legal category”, to
disparage most sources as not credible, written by people not experts in former Yugoslavia or competent in
Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian language, and to minimize figures of rapes and other casualties. As expected, they
discuss rape and genocide for only to deny them both in “the pretty modern European society” of a country
they cherish. Their conclusion could not be but “there is actually almost no good evidence for the proposition
that there was a campaign by Serbian military or political leaders to rape mass numbers of Bosnian women,
even less that there was a campaign to impregnate them.” Finally, all this makes it sound as though mass rape
and genocide in former Yugoslavia were a children's game in the grade school playground.
9 International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro): Judgment, 26
February 2007, ICJ General List no. 91, p. 108, § 297, http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICJ/2007/2.html.
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women, perpetrated as part of genocide against the Muslims in Bosnia during the
conflict^.10
The strategic use of mass rape is well suited for campaigns that involve ethnic
cleansing and genocide, as the objective is to destroy or forcefully remove the target
population. Mass rape instills terror in the civilian population and reduces the likeli-
hood of return and reconstitution [137, 138]. From the organized and systematic nature
of the mass rapes of women both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, many have concluded that
these rapes were part of a larger Serbian campaign of genocide [139]. For many, the
Serbs, with Bthe complicity of Serbian intellectuals^ [140], and sometimes with that of
international networks of experts and institutions [141], were carrying out a policy of
genocidal rape against other ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia.
For the purpose of this argument, the permutational relation between indexical terms
and function values of both rape and marriage may be productively mapped onto a
catastrophist model following Lévi-Strauss’s morphodynamic theory. Indeed, not only
war is a catastrophe, but also rape in war is a catastrophe on its own [142]. Accordingly,
we may offer a catastrophist model to conceptualize rape by means of a canonical
formalization in which the solidarity role of marriage will stand to the hostility of rape
as the ambivalence of marriage stands to the rape politics of an unspeakable and
unthinkable solidarity-1, or Banti-solidarity^:
marriage solidarityð Þ : rape hostilityð Þ :: marriage hostilityð Þ : solidarity
−1
rapeð Þ
Still, this is not only to provide a new description, however elegant, and nothing more.
In a quadratic equation of this type, the generative virtues of the so-called Bdouble
twist^ of the canonical transformation in the structural study of myth imply two
conditions internal to canonical formalization. According to Lévi-Strauss, a formula-
tion of this type reflects a group of transformations in which it is assumed that a relation
of equivalence exists between two situations defined respectively by an inversion of
terms and relations, provided that one of the terms is replaced by its opposite and that a
correlative inversion is made between the function value and the term value of two
elements ([14]:252–253). Indeed, here rape is replaced forcibly by marriage, its
opposite, and a correlative inversion is made between the functional ambivalence of
marriage and the hidden ontology of enforced rape function.
10 Ibid., § 298. TheWorld Court found (although not unanimously) that Serbia was neither directly responsible
for the Srebrenica genocide, nor that it was complicit in it. However, the Court’s Vice-President appended a
dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court, stating that BSerbia’s involvement, as a principal actor or
accomplice, in the genocide that took place in Srebrenica is supported by massive and compelling evidence^.
In his opinion, the involvement or implication of Serbia in the genocide that took place in the 1990s in Former
Yugoslavia was Bboth more serious in nature and more extensive in territorial scope than the mere failure to
prevent genocide in Srebrenica conveys^. This implies that the charge that Serbia was Bresponsible not only
for its failure to prevent genocide but for being actively involved in it either as a principal or alternatively as an
accomplice or by way of conspiracy or incitement would in all probability have been proven had the Court…
followed a different methodology ,^ which could also improve Bthe high standard of proof or the rigor of its
reasoning^. See: International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro):
Judgment, 26 February 2007, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, p. 254, § 30–34,
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13689.pdf.
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Now, for a catastrophist operation of this kind to take place, the very idea of
canonical relation requires a third operating condition, which is external to canonical
formalization. In Lévi-Strauss’s structural study of myth, this condition remains often
implicit and never articulated [27]. In all cases, it is expressed as the necessity of the
crossing of a spatiotemporal boundary, defined in territorial, ecological, linguistic,
cultural, social, or other terms, but which is always a boundary condition in mathe-
matical sense, required to be satisfied at the boundary of a topological domain in which
a set of differential equations is to be solved. The catastrophist operation that requires a
boundary condition of this kind is claimed by Lévi-Strauss to be important in deter-
mining the mathematical solutions to various mythical problems. Namely, a series of
variations inherent in the myths of a given people cannot be fully understood without
going through myths belonging to another people, which are in a relation of inverse
transformation with the formers. Eventually, as shown elsewhere [6, 7, 12], the
requirement of a boundary condition in canonical formalization can anticipate the very
politics of an ideological agency and discursive practice for the lack of which structural
analysis has been undeservedly disregarded.
Cultural activism as a boundary condition
Mass rape cannot be reduced to the psychological attributes of individual aggressors or
any aggregate of organizational factors in armed groups, neither to the reified cultural
traits of a supposed war prone people. All these arguments may be partially attempts at
scholarly interpretation but presumably they are similar to those used by the perpetra-
tors themselves, both at the time and afterwards, as legitimation or apology of the
genocide perpetrated. Mass rape must be understood in relation to specific social
structures, discursive practices and political situations.
As appalling evidence accumulated, it became increasingly clear that many dimen-
sions of Bosnian and Kosovo experiences should be linked to the impact of globaliza-
tion and the consequences of disintegration in the former Yugoslavia than to aggressive
misogynistic masculinity in general and atavistic Balkan brutality in particular. At the
root of the violence, largely instigated by a modern mechanism of war propaganda,
remained the conflict fought out between the leading elites of ethnic-religious and
political entrepreneurs [143]. The highly antagonistic contents of the politicized ethnic
labels of Bosnian, Serb, and Croat, or Serb and Albanian in the 1990s are a result of the
conflicts and wars following the economic collapse and the breakdown of the Yugoslav
state rather than the other way around [144]. Even when traditional ideas of kinship and
ancestry were mobilized to construct the ethnic-religious other, they were used in a new
political context particular to post-socialist Yugoslavia.
While broad structural forces and socioeconomic processes can be seen as necessary
conditions, an alternative interpretation of ethnic violence considers the content and
boundary rules of ethnic categories as constructed by the actions of individual actors
seeking various ends. If individuals are viewed as the agents who construct ethnic
identities, then constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with a
rationalist or strategic choice approach. In particular, they emphasize elite manipulation
of mass publics, but also the violence stemming from ethnic interactions on the ground
when the individual actions of mass publics produce, reproduce, and contest the content
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and boundaries of ethnic categories ([134]:853–857). Indeed, it is striking and no
coincidence that virtually every self-identified constructivist who has written on ethnic
violence has tended to blame elite machinations and politicking. The political dynamics
between moderates and extremists are also an important part of the violent story in
former Yugoslavia. Much of the violence is seen as induced by extremists and
ultranationalists to justify their ultra-extremism both at home and abroad, pushing
moderate leaders into atrocities or portraying themselves to the rest of the world as
moderates holding back the ultras ([123]:355).
In contrast, another interpretation locates the process at the level of supra-individual
things such as Foucault’s Bdiscursive formations^ [145], or Geertz’s Bcultural systems^
that have their own internal logic or agency of culturally specific ways of thinking,
talking, and acting [146]. This symbolic approach suggests that the development of
discursive formations and cultural systems can set one group in opposition to another or
predispose them to see the other as a threat or natural subject for violence, independent
of any more material basis for hostility ([134]:851–853). In practice, discursive forma-
tions or cultural systems seen as the agents of identity construction tend to merge with
older culturalist accounts that portrayed cultures as highly bounded, internally coherent,
and static entities, which strongly determine the behavior of the members of the groups
they constitute (e.g. [147]). The newer constructivist culturalism rejects the idea that
cultures and the discourses that shape or define them are bounded, coherent or static,
but it retains the idea that discourses strongly shape ethnic identities and determine
individual actions. These arguments tend to portray culture in a way that borders on
primordialism, in that people are continually made and remade by discourses that are
essential properties of ethnic groups.
However, despite the apparent primordialism of discursive logics, the rigid divide in
methodological debates between rationalist and culturalist accounts can be bridged.
Strategic theories linking elites or publics to ethnic violence and discursive theories
linking discourses to violent behaviors are all constructivist in the sense that they posit
the content and boundaries of ethnic groups as produced and reproduced by specific
social processes ([134]:874). A discourse is a set of arguments employed by some
actors either in justifying or in intensifying their actions or a policy that is pursued for
some reason. Used in this way, discourses are more strategies than supra-individual
forces with their own internal logics to determine actions and events. In the case of
mass rapes perpetrated by Serbian military forces in Bosnian and Kosovo wars, we may
focus not so much on the discursive impact of honor ideology on sexual violence as on
the political construction of sexual violence by the strategic use of discursive ideolo-
gies. Arguably, mass rapes and sexual violence against women might have fitted the
political needs of warlords, who are then responsible for publicly coding them as honor
violence ethnically targeted. This coding itself had incendiary implications and served
to perpetuate or foster cases of larger scale sexual violence. What is significant is not
that ethnic identities are constructed through violence, but that sexual violence against
women is politically constructed as ethnic violence against women’s community.
The politically destructive intention of rapes perpetrated by Serbian military forces
during the Bosnian War was undoubtedly to eliminate the Bosnian and Croatian
adverse communities just as during the Kosovo War was to eliminate Albanians.
However, this elimination was aimed to work most effectively through the
community’s own self-destruction as a social and ethnic group. Rape becomes a
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particularly patent form of social destruction in patrilineal societies in which gender
ideas take their particular meanings within a prestige structure of honor and feud.
Honor is a basic value in Southeast-European societies, and any explanation of
household organization and gender relations must take account of this cosmological-
philosophical element, which is necessarily activated to link exaggerated values of male
supremacy to mechanisms of female suppression. The traditional perception of women
was rooted in women’s perceived diminution of the masculine ideal as an independent
and self-sufficient honor. The more the males were construed to be omnipotent, the
more the ostensibly insignificant females threatened this omnipotence, which involved
a problem of control over women. The ability of a household’s men to control their
women was one of many indicators of the household’s strength. Women’s chastity,
indeed, provided one of the main concepts in the chain of men’s rights that made up the
key ideal of family honor on which the blood-feud rested.
Honor and shame have been discussed as Btwo poles of an evaluation^ in Mediter-
ranean societies [148]. Not surprisingly, in Southeast European societies, people also
came to realize and assert explicitly that women affected a man’s prestige. In Greek
mountain communities, Bthe manliness of the men in any family protects the sexual
honor of its women from external insult or outrage, [while] the women must have
shame if the manliness of the men is not to be dishonored^ ([149]:271). Ethnographic
accounts of South Slavic communities have also constantly shown that evidence of lack
of control over women would indicate weakness and possibly reveal the men’s
vulnerability to other external challenges ([150]:254–255). Among Albanians, it was
the importance of upholding family honor and prestige which frequently would lead to
a blood-feud and, indeed, helped to perpetuate the tradition of blood-feud.
In the public opinion of local community, the essential element in marriage was
virginity of the bride, expected of all unmarried women, as was her chaste behavior as a
married woman, a stipulation that ensured that her offspring will indeed be genuine
heirs of her husband’s lineage. With such a conception, society rendered itself partic-
ularly vulnerable to potential confusion created by infidel women. While it might be
sufficient reason for a bride to be repudiated by the groom’s house if she was found not
to be a virgin, by Bsleeping around^ (bredhur), women could literally mess up the
whole neatly ordered patrilineal system. It follows logically that adultery was punished
most severely, whereby the offended male, be it father, brother or husband, had the
right to kill both woman and lover ([151]:230). Indeed, one occasion when a sister was
never avenged was when she was taken in adultery and killed together with her
paramour. The woman would not be avenged, as she would be thought to have acted
against the honor of her own family. The high valuation of chastity is therefore bound
up with the ideal of family honor, and women were seen only as contributing to or
detracting from family honor, not as individuals with virtue of their own right.
Inasmuch as the stance of the group’s invulnerability represented by its family honor
was crucial to its competitive situation with other groups, it was obvious that the stance
of women’s adultery, making a Blaughingstock^ of the moral integrity and honor of the
family, would be very damaging to men attempting to play their roles out in the public
arena. In these conditions, it becomes self-evident that in the case of raped women, the
shame of victimization would be far worse than the perpetration of the crime. Com-
mentators of mass rapes during the Bosnian war and the Kosovo war in former
Yugoslavia might ponder that these assumptions must already exist to support a policy
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of mass rape, for Bif they do not, this policy loses its coercive power and may not be as
successful in driving families apart or securing ethnic cleansing^ ([102]:564). The fact
that both victims and perpetrators willingly forward such assumptions as a short
expedient to explain the atrocious experience of mass rapes should at least make
commentators and social scientists curious about them. There is no evidence of such
an awareness and seldom is any account taken of the possibility that these assumptions
could be deliberately activated.
Feminist scholarship has mapped the propaganda value of rape stories at various
points in armed conflicts. In former Yugoslavia [107], as elsewhere [152], rape
narratives were deployed in different ways to construct shifting conceptions of group
identity. By recognizing as criminal different types of harm, the legal categorization of
war crimes provides also a language by which the Tribunal can identify and witnesses
can testify to their experiences of legally recognized harm [77]. However, a typical
legal academicism and intellectualism prevents feminist legal scholars to see that it is
not the Tribunal recognition of rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing and genocide
that places gender and ethnic identities into particular positions within a gendered and
ethnic grammar of violence ([105]:155), but the other way around. It is political
urgency and the selective mobilization of rape narratives for nationalist propaganda
that uses the rules and structures of a gendered and ethnic grammar of violence to make
rape a weapon of war, which deliberately assign people to essential positions of gender
inequality and ethnic divisions. This means that gender and ethnic identities do not pre-
exist violence and violence is not mapped simply onto existing historical identities and
ethnic divisions. For the violence to be effective, the discursive activation of a gendered
and ethnic grammar of violence must create and essentialize historical identities and
ethnic divisions in the first place.
A major concern of contemporary anthropological scholarship on gendered wartime
violence, in former Yugoslavia [103, 104] or elsewhere [84, 153–156], is the role of
traditionalist and nationalist discourses, which is mathematically identified here as a
logical necessity by the requirement of a boundary condition in canonical formaliza-
tion. Actually, in a context in which mass rape was deliberately used as a possible
instrument of ethnic cleansing, everything happened as if the activation of a specific
political and instrumental agency was necessary for the notorious effectiveness of mass
rape to take place. This kind of ideological agency can be shown to promote and put
forward the cultural assumptions specific to a given group. During the Bosnian war and
the Kosovo war in former Yugoslavia, it was provided by the increasing role of
deliberate discourses to burst moral order and social morphology in the first place,
precisely by bringing to the fore the destructive workings of family honor and blood
ideology. Indeed, the mass rapes of women were intended to forcefully instill a kind of
shame and disgrace as a social pollution that should bring necessarily the disorder and
break-up of the social system of any group in its totality. Typically, at war, such a social
pollution and catastrophic disorder is termed in Albanian with a generic term for Btotal
killing^, shfarosje, which means literally Bkinship uprooting^.
The systematic rape of women during the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War may
have carried further-reaching repercussions than the initial displacement of rape vic-
tims. Stress, caused by the trauma of rape, coupled with the lack of access to
reproductive health care often experienced by displaced peoples, lead to serious health
risks for victimized women [157, 158]. In addition, the discursive practices that
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surrounds the issues of rape during wartime frequently lead to pervasive discrimination
against specific social groups, outrageous acts of violence against women, and neglect
of children who are born of rape during wartime [102]. In 1993, when people
worldwide were talking about raped and impregnated women in former Yugoslavia,
almost nothing was said about these women as suffering beings. Women who survived
these horrendous experiences have undergone egregious human rights violations, but
their experiences were overshadowed by political and military discussions about
wartime rape as a method of ethnic cleansing.
In particular, the maternal agony of women who bore children conceived from war
rapes devastated women and had more serious consequences for their future than any
other aspect of rape. Moreover, the innocent children born of rape during wartime or in
the war’s aftermath, because they represent or stand in for the perpetrators of the crime
to their mothers, are frequently punished in terrible and unjust ways. These children are
often viewed purely as other, despite the fact that members of their mothers’ ethnic
groups usually raise them. The father’s ethnic identity and the shame surrounding the
conception are the only factors that matter. For those women who are raising their
children, their anger and resentment may give rise to abuse. Many women Battempt to
kill their babies at birth in a reaction that, speaking strictly in terms of the mother’s
psychological well-being, might even be considered healthy^ ([102]:571). The high
rates of infanticide and the acceptance of these incidents as natural reflect the ways in
which the rights of these children are severely undermined [101]. Further, the language
used to describe and label these children is extremely derogatory. As the child born of
rape in France during the First World War was called Bthe child of the barbarian^ [159],
media reports showed that children born of rape in Bosnia are called Bchildren of hate^
or in Kosovo they are known as Bchildren of shame^. All the labels connect the
children to their fathers both rapist and enemy, a legacy they can never escape. As
these children grow up and become aware of the fact, life becomes even more difficult.
Returning to a paraphrased Lévi-Strauss’s terminology from The Raw and The
Cooked [15], the unspeakable political effectiveness of mass rapes is forwarded to
account not just for a Braw^madness of cultural norms and values. It is mainly the twist
of a Bcooked^ evil of ideological agency acting as an instrumental politics of ethnic
cleansing during ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The cultural
activism of family honor and blood ideology makes it possible afterwards for family
norms and values to be converted into ethnic-religious ideology, for ethnicity to be
converted into nationalist consciousness, for this consciousness to become organized
into conflict, and for organized nationalism to become militarist, masculinist, misogy-
nist, racist, and violent.
The cultural activism commonly obscures another important fact of a purely ideo-
logical dimension. The cultural myths and ideologies of honor and blood associated
with patrilineality are often conflated with the actual practices of patriarchy. Many
commentators (e.g. [160]), including the International Tribunal record (see [106]), have
too easily assumed that the patriarchal language and discourses that symbolically
support patrilineality result uniformly in outcomes and practices that they simply reify
as patriarchal. Both the myth of many children and the family myth of honor and blood
within the so-called lineage structures of the supposed patriarchal Albanian family are
commonly constructed and conveyed in academic writings, the media and stereotyped
opinions. However, as shown elsewhere [1], the ideological construction of these myths
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can be invalidated if we take what is put forward as empirical evidence to be nothing
more than a strong cultural activism where both women and men are subjugated to the
reproduction of social norms and values.
More than anything else, cultural pressure aims at limiting Albanian women to their
childbearing function and Albanian men to their protecting function. Incidentally, such
cultural pressure is activated deliberately and instrumentally when the bloody honor of
men might be shown to have been sullied because of their women being raped during
the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In this case, we may suggest that rape
acquires an immediate political function because it is sufficiently clear that the logic
of family relations, based on a highly patriarchal model of family ideology where honor
is central and a generator of violence, strongly binds the production of male subjects to
ethnic politics.
Some human rights scholar are consumedwith the distinction of mass rapes in former
Yugoslavia between the short-term politics of forced impregnation and the long-term
politics of community destruction. They naively believe that if the intent is to actually
subjugate women to gang rape, impregnate them and force them to bring pregnancy to
term, rape is not being used for ethnic cleansing or genocide and it is inappropriate to
describe the politics of mass rapes as an instrument of ethnic cleansing and genocide
[101, 102]. In this argument, the paramount assumption underpinning the human rights
protection of children born of war rape is that identity cannot be biologically and
paternally given. Biology cannot exclusively matter in determining identity because
the father cannot exclusively transmit his own identity to the child. In other words, in
constructing identity, the maternal contributions, both genetic and cultural, cannot be
marginal and the women cannot serve as vessels that impart paternal identity.
However, to assume that the people themselves do not know what human rights
scholars suppose to know better also allows a convenient view of irrational people, or at
least a state of ignorance of peoples, regarded as utterly primitive and which could even
be presented as an indicator of their backwardness. As shown elsewhere [34, 161], this
might have been the position of many early anthropologists who supposed that the
peoples they observed have the ignorance and simple-mindedness of young children.
What evolutionists thought on the whole, as Malinowski did believe some time later
[162], is that primitive peoples were unaware of the physiological process of procre-
ating a child. The explanation has nothing to do either, as more recent anthropologists
are too quick to believe ([163]:87), with those sorts of Bobvious^ or Bcommon-sense^
reasons based on the application of interpretive grids that ignore the biochemical nature
of impregnation.
As the Bvirgin birth^ debate initiated by Edmund Leach showed, whether some peoples
were truly unaware or simply claimed to be unaware of the appropriate men’s and
women’s roles in procreation are by no means the result of ignorance or innocence, but
they proceed from a very subtle ideological argumentation [164]. The ethnographic
evidence generally leads to the conclusion that such purported ignorance is founded on
the expression of certain ideological beliefs. In patrilineal societies, the biological princi-
ple of blood (gjaku) is ideologically worked out as to be assumed as being transferred
from father to son, and this ideological elaboration must have brought these people to take
a view of the person strongly rooted in fatherhood [165]. If we listen to Albanians, for
instance, we shall have to acknowledge that they construe identity as a matter of showing
forth what already lies within.We find paradoxically but perhaps inevitably that Albanians
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are completely taken up with proving their intrinsic kind. Agnates do not become, they are
agnates in perpetuity, all the way back from the beginning, from the very root or aptly the
Bseed^ of kinship (farefis). For Albanians, gjaku ujë nuk bëhet, Bblood cannot be watered
down^, a fact that they often assert explicitly.
What these people are saying, quite explicitly, goes beyond the simple question of
whether or not the physiological process of fathering children is known. Sexual
intercourse is a necessary condition, but paternity is not merely an awareness of the
connection between sexual intercourse and pregnancy, which cannot serve purely to
affirm the social recognition of paternity. A woman gets pregnant because she con-
ceives, and it is this ideological notion of conception that is far more important.
Traditionally, the physiological contribution to the child was coded differently for
men and women, and therefore their connection to the child was imagined as different.
Women are fertile and maternity was meant to give birth and give nurture, whereas
paternity has meant begetting, which was seen as the primary, essential and creative
role, making man bring reason, order and regulation in the created life. Precisely for
that reason, the cultural activism that exacerbates the family ideology of blood and
honor can become necessary as additional agency for the political effectiveness of war
rapes to take place as an instrument of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
In turn, cultural activism should allow us to account for the structural, historical and
political conditions in which social behavior takes place. A more experiential under-
standing of ethnographic evidence [31], as in the case of sex selection at birth [1] or
ways of expressing labor pain at childbirth [166], can make us aware that people are not
necessarily bound by culture. The fact that women unwillingly speak of their atrocious
experiences of rape and sexual violence, preferring to stay silent about them, or if they
speak, to preserve anonymity, should at least make social scientists curious about those
women who do not talk and about their refusal to give testimonies in front of TV
cameras. There is no evidence of such an awareness on the part of any of the great
promoters of women’s rights who choose instead to explain their refusal through almost
exclusively culturalist discussions that make essential the traditionalist-survivalist
concepts of shame and honor.
Since Ernest Renan and his pioneering conceptualization of nationality, we know
that history is full of meaningful silences, where the things that are deemed to oblivion
or relegated to the not-said suggest what preoccupies a society better than what is said
and is remembered [167]. After genocide, a resourceful art of Bremembering to forget^
must have moved Rwanda the way forward to a success story [168, 169]. In Southeast
European and more generally Mediterranean societies, it is always the façade of honor
which needs to be upheld to maintain social status and integrity, independent of
anything that has actually happened, and this is best achieved through silence about
potentially disruptive facts [170]. That is why a culturalist linking of rape with ideas of
honor is always mistaken and as reports from the former Yugoslavia indicate, violations
of honor and modesty are wholly inadequate concepts to express the suffering of
women raped during war ([64]:674). This means that Bthe silence of war rape forms
a black hole in the collective memory^ that harks back to cultural contest rather than to
actual experience or post-fact construction ([171]:48–49).
Surely, empathy and trust of various kinds are prerequisite in understanding and
coming to terms with women’s silence, especially in the context of a fundamental lack
of trust even in a mechanism of transitional justice that appears to avoid the traps of
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courtroom justice or a feminist approach to justice. Subjectivity in suffering may be
socially conditioned but the individual ways of expressing subjectivity after trauma are
not culture-determined, but context-dependent, mostly escapist and sometimes subver-
sive, as in the case of Albanian women, victims of war rape in Kosovo. Women’s
political subjectivity, or women’s voice, can also be expressed through silence, which
can be seen as one of the many strategic choices and can have different meanings
within specific institutional and cultural contexts [172]. While silence is seen as a
reflection of the patriarchal order, and as the embodiment of political and social
oppression, the continual recreation and manipulation of the various links between
women’s voice and silence are culturally constructed in close relation to power and
gender, but people do not necessarily follow cultural dictates.
In a way alike Foucault arguing that Bpoints of resistance are present everywhere in the
power network^ ([173]:96), Lévi-Strauss might put that voice and silence convey the
same coded information in a looped message transmitted in different contexts, while Bthe
role of structural analysis is to look beyond the apparent disorder of phenomena and to
restore the underlying order^ ([18]:190). Arguably, as a specific social behavior related to
honor values and practices, like migration and dislocation, silence could be another
indirect indication of women’s agency to resist the traditionalist-survivalist frameworks
of patriarchal ideology, thus emerging as only but one important strategy of avoiding the
social consequences of cultural activism. In the aftermath of war in Kosovo, women’s
silence should also be seen as an affirmative strategy of resistance, not a symbol of
passivity and powerlessness ([174]:163), but another context among the manifestations
of women’s agency examined elsewhere as a strategic defense against ideas of cultural
coherence aiming to maintain the existing order of power and gender [36].
Not only the media and many accounts often omitted paradoxically to mention that in
Bosnia and in Kosovo people Bare struggling to love children of hate^, but at different
times and for different reasons, Kosovo survivors of sexual violence have followed
either a strategy of silence or one of speech. Lately they also resolved to ask for
recognition and to lobby for reparations. After war, it was not reticence, or a sense of
honor propriety and chastity, which stopped Albanian women from testifying, but their
experience of betrayal by the institutions, by the society, and by their own families [67].
Facing what they perceived as social and institutional indifference, they had chosen
silence. This convergence of individual and social silence might have been a sort of
complicity of the powerless with imposed silences, or a Bsilent security dilemma^ [175]
constrained by social exclusion, traditions, and the dominance of exclusionary public
discourses, where speaking may endanger the speaker and silence is the only choice.
While some women may be silent, the image of the shamed, silent woman victim in
Bosnia or in Kosovo is patently inaccurate. Indeed, when they speak to denounce the
crime they suffered, Bthey talk about these crimes with openness and anger, not shame^
([106]:79). The reluctance Albanian women to speak about their experiences can be seen
as negating the various institutional spaces that in Kosovo persistently demand that
Albanian women speak out. Seemingly, they might have perceived the techniques of
the political economy of language as generalized and diffuse means of exercising power
through judgment, categorization, surveillance, and documentation ([174]:164). They
also rebelled against the control of male hierarchy to maintain rules of honor and
propriety, which oppressed and suffocated both women andmen. Some dissented because
the style and organization of reporting of human rights violations often erased Bthe
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identity of victims of sexual violence with a stroke of the pen, so that they became known
just as the wife, the daughter, or the cousin of some man^. Others explicitly rebelled
against the traditionalist opinion that women were Bcollateral damage, that the damage
and violations didn’t really affect the women, but the men^ ([67]:627).
As a logical outcome, we may ultimately agree to consider that women’s strategic
choice of silence is directed above all against the gendered propaganda that fueled the
cultural activism of honor ideology in preparation for the Yugoslav wars. Women’s
silence may be a strategic voice to make it ineffective and stop such cultural activism
that first focused on the fertility of Albanian women in Kosovo and continued during the
wars as a major mobilizing factor leading to the perpetration of human rights violations,
sexual violence, crimes against humanity, and genocide in former Yugoslavia.
Conclusion
In attempting to analyze the empirical evidence of mass rapes, the aim of this article was
to frame the argument in such a way as to focus on the problematization of different
accounts and move away from the close association of a major and sensitive issue with
the essentialization of culture, history, and society. After the Bwriting culture^ debate
[176] and the declaration of war against reification and essentialism, we have become
even less able to address that dimension of human life on which anthropologists used to
claim some expertise. Namely, the ordered system of acquired, cognitive and symbolic
meanings in terms of which social behavior takes place, we still label Bculture^, and
which is established by convention, reproduced by traditional transmission, and largely
shared by a social group [146]. In our eagerness to deconstruct whatever entities were
formerly considered to be Bout there^ and to highlight process and agency over structure
and culture, as already pointed by scholars concerned with honor killings [177], we have
contributed to making it intellectually and politically contentious to talk intelligently
about differences that very tangibly affect people’s lives.
Similarly, to accept the validity of rapes testimony of both victims and perpetrators
about the lack of freedom experienced by many women or about the male dominance
over female victims is to offer a blanket condemnation of culture as a given determinant
of social behavior. Acknowledging the cultural dimensions of human acts and motives
need not imply a reductionist understanding of culture. To account for the structural,
historical and political conditions in which social behavior takes place is not to reduce
all members of a community to social beings who Bhave a culture^ and are Bculturally
determined^ in their individual experiences, their subjectivity of suffering and their
personal aspirations, nor that they are pre-programmed to react in the same manner
always and everywhere.
Anthropologists using feminist approaches to analyze gendered dimensions of war
violence, whether in former Yugoslavia [66, 71, 103, 104], or elsewhere, are deeply
sensitive to the ways in which both historical context and cultural background may
influence the political and war-strategic meaning of rapes. They explore how concep-
tions about accountability and expected gender roles in a particular time and place may
lead social actors to commit atrocities that transgress the moral codes of their own
society, while condemning their victims to silence [171]. We argued here for a critical
approach to the hegemonic commitments by focusing on the political process of
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cultural activism and ideology that define the strategic effectiveness of mass rapes as an
instrument of ethnic cleansing. The aim of this article was not to provide a new account
of mass rapes in former Yugoslavia, but rather to examine how various interpretations
and the political implications of these accounts have succeeded in obscuring, rather
than explaining, the politics of mass rapes in ethnic conflict.
The mathematical validity to isolate cultural activism as a specific ideological and
political instrumentality of mass rapes as a military strategy of ethnic cleansing in
former Yugoslavia may appear unusual, and difficult to grasp, if one schematically
employs traditional categories, as developed in some feminist accounts dealing with
this question. In turn, an articulate analysis of the empirical evidence and local
structures, linked to a neo-structural modelling of canonical formalization based on
transformational morphodynamics, is likely to produce a more sophisticated and critical
understanding of the purported role of cultural factors. Definitely, to understand how
the sinisterly effective politics of mass rapes became possible, it is necessary to reveal
how cultural activism and nationalist projects may mobilize a traditionalist-survivalist
discourse that activates the cultural ideology of family honor and blood purity. Relying
on a reified moral order and an assumed group ideology of people caught up in conflict,
this deliberate activation construct both gender and war, indeed en-gendering the war
itself. In this sense, there are not the actual cultural norms and social structures that
involve a re-traditionalism of cultural and moral values. It is the deliberate discur-
sive activation of cultural activism that fuels such a re-traditionalism, while the
instrumental use of both identity politics and moral values promotes a new hidden
agency that make it possible for mass rapes to become an effective weapon of
ethnic cleansing. Eventually, the side effect of this situation seems to be a potential
underestimation of the pressing problems before the massive occurrence of the
phenomenon and the ineffectiveness of international arrangements to provide
justice to survivors.
In methodological terms, we tried to engage with a comparative analysis and
formalization of the empirical evidence on motivations and practices rather than with
a search for positive literal proof. This approach might not be exhaustive, and certainly,
a number of questions remain open. However, if these methodological reflections have
managed to provoke at the very least a non-stereotyped discussion on the mathematical
validity of the role of cultural ideology as a logical necessity of the politics of mass
rapes in ethnic conflict, they will hopefully constitute a starting point for further debate
and deeper enquiries that may yield alternative explanations. Ultimately, while the
difficulty of simultaneously using distinct intersubjective approaches and taking
into account distinct strands of explanatory interpretations is clearly realized, the
attempt to articulate them in relation to one another may lead to a fascinating
intellectual problem. The conceptual aspects of this approach may not only show
how to deal with an extant problem of social justice but may also have important
theoretical and methodological implications beyond those of the specific issue
addressed in this article.
If we agree with the epistemological insight inspired from the structural study of
myth, an ultimate innovative direction can be argued to establish a more sophisticated
approach following structural procedures of transformational analysis and formaliza-
tion. While it may not hitherto have been expressed so directly, this means that we may
be correct in asserting that from an empirical situation of social change, including social
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conflict, identity construction and ethnic identification, transcribed in canonical way,
we can in theory deduce the possibly hidden reality of an external boundary, borderland
existence, or border-crossing movement. The social morphodynamics of this reality
would reveal itself in the form of an ideologically or politically instrumental agency,
just as the morphodynamic analysis of ethnic rapes is an illustrative example revealing
the workings of family honor and blood ideology. The hidden reality so revealed will
necessarily be organized around a specific category of social hierarchy associated with
the value of one identity element, human agency and social action, but having inverse
propositional characteristics to that element, course of action and agency. To put it the
other way around, new social change and identity construction can be anticipated as a
result of the mediating logical operation of a boundary condition within the same
sociocultural or institutional frameworks, and we can be able to set off in their search
and their appreciation.
Finally, if we are correct in these assumptions overall, a new anthropologically
informed movement is born in social theory, which may be called neo-structural
constructivism and which shall account for the structural dynamics of change and
conflict while revealing the hidden aspect of ideological agencies and political projects.
The conceptual aspects of this new approach suggest that it is important not to rely only
on surface observations of data and ethnography. Rather, critical analysis of empirical
evidence and intersections of ethnography with both experiential understanding and
structural formalization can yield new insights in the space between idiographic and
nomothetic understandings of culture, politics, and ideology.
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